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The Yellow Brick Road to Nowhere:  
California Same-Sex Marvin Rights After 
Proposition 8 
Adam C. Hartmann* 
INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after Dorothy Gale begins her journey down the 
yellow brick road in The Wizard of Oz she comes to a crossroads 
that extends in two different directions.1  She wonders aloud 
which way to go, when the Scarecrow confuses her by saying that 
one way is nice, but the other way is nice too, and some people go 
both ways, which he punctuates by simultaneously pointing in 
both directions.2  California’s gay and lesbian population can 
sympathize with Dorothy’s confusion, having been at the mercy 
of the courts for their property and support agreements, while 
the courts were metaphorically pointing both ways.3  The picture 
is not any clearer today—the contractual rights of same-sex 
couples that have forgone the domestic partnership option 
remain vague in light of the outcome of Proposition 8.4 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, 2011.  I would like to thank 
Chapman Law Review 2009–2010 Senior Notes and Comments Editors Katayon Khajebag 
and Rachel Warren and Professor Gary Gorczyca for their guidance and suggestions.  I 
would especially like to thank my wife, Melissa Hartmann, for her constant inspiration, 
love and support. 
 1 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
 2 Id. 
 3 As discussed infra, California’s same-sex couples do not have the same rights to 
marry as heterosexual couples; whether unmarried same-sex couples have the same 
ability to enforce contracts for property and support is the question that sparked this 
Comment.  The “signs” pointing both ways symbolize California cases that have split on 
whether same-sex couples can enforce cohabitation agreements. 
 4 The ballot measure known as Proposition 8, which was approved by a majority of 
California voters at the November 4, 2008 election, proposed  to add a new section to the 
California Constitution which provides, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 
48, 59 (Cal. 2009).  For more information on Proposition 8, see CALIFORNIA 
PROPOSITION 8: GET THE FACTS ON PROP. 8, http://www.whatisprop8.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010).  Unofficial results showed that the measure passed 52.3% to 47.7%, and a 
color-coded map of the results indicates that only citizens in the coastal areas north of Los 
Angeles County and a small swath near the California-Nevada border were more likely 
than not to have voted “no” on Proposition 8, whereas voters in all inland areas and 
nearly all of Southern California were more likely to have voted “yes” on the measure and 
thereby approve the state constitutional amendment restricting marriage. Proposition 8—
Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, 
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Proposition 8 has been cast as a same-sex marriage issue, 
but it is more than that.  Inasmuch as Proposition 8 reiterates 
the state’s public policy favoring marriage, it also casts into stark 
relief the fact that unmarried couples lack the legislative and 
judicial protections marriage confers—particularly the right to 
freely contract with one another for support and property.5  
California’s approval of so-called “cohabitation contracts,” or 
contracts between parties who live together, seemed clear after 
Marvin v. Marvin.6  But subsequent California courts have 
chipped away at the definitive Marvin decision7 to the point 
where it is unclear whether same-sex cohabitants can contract 
with one another for property and support.8 
This Comment argues that Proposition 8 should spur the 
California legislature to clarify same-sex couples’ cohabitation 
rights because judicial precedents are inconsistent.9  Part I will 
explore the history and growing popularity of cohabitation in the 
United States, with particular attention given to sociological 
factors that have led heterosexuals and homosexuals alike to opt 
for living together before marriage—or even instead of marriage.  
Part II will turn to California’s community property scheme as it 
affects unmarried cohabiting partners, since property division is 
a crucial aspect of cohabitation agreements, and it will examine 
 
ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 26, 2008, 1:34 PM), http://vote2008.sos.ca.gov/Returns/props/ 
map190000000008.htm (move cursor around the map for voting results by county). 
 5 Estimates suggest that married couples enjoy nearly 2,500 combined state and 
federal rights that unmarried couples do not. Pittsburgh Considers Domestic Partnership 
Law, 2 WESTERN PA FREEDOM TO MARRY COAL. 1, 3 (1997), available at 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/user/scotts/ftp/wpaf2mc/newsletter2-4.pdf.  See Kitty Mak, 
California’s New Domestic Partner Registration Act May Aid Same-Sex Partners in 
Providing a Legal Basis for Their Life Relationships, L.A. CNTY. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=1105 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (“there are 
limits to what [same-sex] couples may be able to accomplish via contract.  Private 
contracts have no legal effect on government-conferred rights and obligations such as tax 
benefits, parentage, custody and visitation arrangements, and child support obligations”). 
 6 See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  The Marvin decision 
essentially allows cohabitants to contract with one another for property and services, 
provided the agreement is not based primarily on sexual services. Id. at 110, 113.  See 
also People v. Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“‘Cohabitation’ 
means simply to live or dwell together in the same habitation”). 
 7 The pair of cases that threw the Marvin standard into chaos are Jones v. Daly, 
176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) and Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  The cases were confusing because they centered on nearly identical 
agreements between same-sex partners, but the latter was upheld while the former was 
not. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 134; Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 406–07, 409–10. 
 8 Opposite-sex couples could theoretically face the same difficulties enforcing 
cohabitation contracts after Proposition 8.  This Comment focuses on same-sex couples for 
two reasons: one, Marvin v. Marvin remains good law for opposite-sex cohabitation 
contracts, despite plaintiff Michelle Triola’s inability to recover damages; two, it is the 
author’s belief that Proposition 8 served more to reject homosexual relationships than 
establish a hierarchy of heterosexual relationships. 
 9 See supra note 8. 
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how courts have settled past property issues between unmarried 
cohabitants.  Part III will address the unique aspects of same-sex 
cohabitation agreements.  Part IV will argue that California 
courts may look at same-sex Marvin agreements differently 
following Proposition 8.  Part IV will also illustrate how Illinois 
brought public policy directly to bear on cohabitation agreements, 
and will argue that federal or state legislation is crucial in 
clarifying and protecting the rights of same-sex couples as 
cohabiting partners.  Finally, Part V provides drafts of two 
potential cohabitation-agreement statutes, one in favor and one 
against, to show what such statutes might look like, and to urge 
the legislature to devise meaningful cohabitation statutes that 
are compatible with existing public policy. 
I.  COHABITATION AS A SOCIAL TREND 
A. Despite its Popularity, Cohabitation Presents Practical and 
Sociological Challenges, Especially for Same-Sex Couples 
Numerous studies suggest the rate of “cohabitation,” i.e., 
unmarried couples living together, has spiked since the 1960s.10  
The Census Bureau has estimated there were about 6.8 million 
opposite-sex cohabiting couples in the United States in 2008,11 
and an additional 741,000 same-sex cohabiting couples.12  
Although cohabitation has been traced back to the early 1800s in 
Australia and many European countries, historically it was less 
 
 10 MARY ANN LAMANNA & AGNES RIEDMANN, MARRIAGES & FAMILIES: MAKING 
CHOICES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 189–90 (Chris Caldeira et al. eds., 2009).  See also NANCY 
D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE 
LAW 177 (2008) (noting that cohabitation rates have grown significantly since Marvin v. 
Marvin). 
 11 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, As Baby Boomers Age, Fewer Families Have Children 
Under 18 at Home, NEWSROOM (Feb. 25, 2009). http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/ 
archives/families_households/cb09-29.html. 
 12 MARTIN O’CONNELL & DAPHNE LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONFERENCE 
REPORT, COUNTING SAME-SEX COUPLES: OFFICIAL ESTIMATES AND UNOFFICIAL GUESSES 
6–20 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/files/counting-
paper.pdf.  The 2007 estimate of 741,000 figure for same-sex couples is up from the 
estimated 594,000 in the 2000 Census. Id.  Earlier estimates of same-sex couples were 
unreliable; for example, 253,000 same-sex couples were reported as spouses in the 2000 
Census, which was troubling because same-sex marriage was only legalized in 2004, and 
at that point only in Massachusetts. Id.  The authors speculate that couples may have 
selected the “spouse” option because it best represented how they felt, or because it most 
resembled their civil union or domestic-partnership status. Id.  The rate of unmarried 
cohabitation among opposite-sex and same-sex couples has risen more rapidly than first 
thought. CATHERINE FITCH ET AL., POPULATION ASS’N OF AMERICA, THE RISE OF 
COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: NEW HISTORICAL ESTIMATES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/cohab-revised2.pdf. Flaws in defining cohabiting 
couples led the Census Bureau, as well as scholars relying on Census Bureau figures, to 
dramatically understate the true number of cohabiting couples in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Id. 
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common in the United States.13  Likewise, a late-1980s study 
indicated that only two percent of adults reaching adulthood just 
prior to or shortly after World War II reported having cohabited 
before their first marriage.14  Since then, the stigmatization of 
unmarried cohabitation has lessened considerably, a change that 
marriage researcher David Popenoe attributes primarily to the 
sexual revolution in the late-1960s, which essentially endorsed 
premarital sex.15 
In light of an increasing number of cohabiting couples in 
America and many European nations, proponents of cohabitation 
advance a number of reasons why cohabitation is desirable—
measuring readiness for, interest in, or compatibility for, 
marriage.16  Cohabitation is positively deemed an alternative to 
dating or being single,17 thus allowing the partners to develop a 
mature relationship and share finances.18 As such, while 
 
 13 ARLAND THORNTON ET AL., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 72 (2007).  David 
Popenoe, co-director of the National Marriage Project at Rutgers University, has written 
that “[i]n America before 1970, for example, cohabitation was uncommon, a deviant and 
unlawful practice found only among people at the margins of our society.” DAVID 
POPENOE, NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND CHILD 
WELLBEING: A CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/NMP2008CohabitationReport.pdf. 
 14 THORNTON ET AL., supra note 13 (noting, however, that the population of 
cohabitation increased significantly after World War II and even began to affect children; 
by the late 1990s, about 40% of all out-of-wedlock births were to cohabiting parents). 
 15 See POPENOE, supra note 13.  Popenoe’s research has indicated that since 1970, 
cohabitation has increased more than 1,000%, and cohabiting couples now comprise about 
10% of all couples. Id.  One study indicated that by 1995, 45%  of women between the ages 
of nineteen and forty-four had lived with an unmarried partner. Larry Bumpass & Hsien-
hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the 
United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32 (2000).  Likewise, a 2002 report indicated 
48.8% of men and 50% of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four had cohabited 
at some point with an opposite-sex partner. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, FERTILITY, CONTRACEPTION, AND FATHERHOOD: DATA ON MEN AND WOMEN 
FROM CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 61 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_026.pdf; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. 
WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 86 (2005), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.  One scholar has argued that 
the popularity of unmarried cohabitation helps explain the drop in the marriage rate 
since the 1970s. KATHLEEN HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE 
AND LAW 4 (2006). 
 16 THORNTON ET AL., supra note 13, at 72–73.  Recent studies suggest more than 60% 
of young men and women would want to live with a partner before marrying them, to 
make sure they are compatible. Id.  See also POPENOE, supra note 13 (reporting that in a 
national survey of young adults aged twenty to twenty-nine, 43% agreed that “you would 
only marry someone if he or she agreed to live together with you first, so that you could 
find out whether you really get along”). 
 17 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10, at 190.  There are different motivations for 
living with someone;; partners who live together because they don’t want to be single are 
“uncommitted cohabitors,” while partners who live together in a marriage-like 
relationship are “committed cohabitors.” Id. at 190–91. 
 18 Valarie King & Mindy E. Scott, A Comparison of Cohabiting Relationships Among 
Older and Younger Adults, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 271, 282 (2005) (noting that sharing 
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cohabitation is gaining recognition socially and legally,19 hurdles 
remain.  Historian Stephanie Coontz has concluded that the 
United States has not yet completed a transition from a society 
where cohabitation was a form of courtship before marriage to 
one where cohabitation is acceptable but remains socially and 
legally different than marriage.20  Other research indicates that 
marriages preceded by cohabitation tend to break up at higher 
rates, and cohabitation leads to a higher rate of breakups overall, 
even when the couple does not marry.21  Cohabitants are 
generally younger, less educated, less religious, earn less income, 
and are more likely to have experienced parental divorce or 
marital problems during childhood.22  In contrast, married people 
are happier, healthier, wealthier, and live longer.23 
II.  COHABITATION AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
A. A Brief History of Community Property 
With cohabitation gaining popularity among the population 
at large, it was inevitable that by the early 1970s, California 
courts would have to start determining how property should be 
divided when cohabitation relationships end.24  California is one 
 
living expenses was a popular reason for cohabitation among both older and younger 
survey subjects). 
 19 POLIKOFF, supra note 10, at 177–78 (noting that the American Law Institute (ALI) 
created a “domestic partners” category in its 2006 Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution that applies marital dissolution rules to qualifying cohabiting couples).  A 
number of commentators sharply criticized the ALI’s move, including Ron Haskins, 
welfare policy adviser to President George W. Bush, who said that “[c]ohabitation is a 
plague . . . and we should do what we can [to] discourage it.” Id. at 179.  See generally 
Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles are 
One Step in the Right Direction, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 358–80 (2004).  For another 
perspective on cohabitation, see HEATHER BROOK, CONJUGAL RITES: MARRIAGE AND 
MARRIAGE-LIKE RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE LAW 153 (2007) (“[Cohabitation] is 
simultaneously romantic and mundane; a scene of potential liberation and regulation.  
For some, cohabitation is shameful, even sinful.  For others, it is a situation arising 
almost accidentally, out of apathy or convenience rather than by design.”). 
 20 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10.  See also BROOK, supra note 19, at 165 
(describing marriage as a sign of actively accepting state regulation and cohabitation as 
passively being regulated by the state). 
 21 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 15, at 33. 
 22 NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007: THE SOCIAL 
HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/ 
SOOU2007.pdf.  At least one study has suggested that same-sex couples break up no more 
often than heterosexual couples. DONALD J. CANTOR ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE 
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION IN AMERICA 75 (2006) (concluding that “the 
factors that can contribute to relationship quality, satisfaction and stability are similar 
for heterosexual and homosexual couples”). 
 23 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10.  See also NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, 
THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007, supra note 22. 
 24 See generally In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).  See 
also Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).  Both of these cases 
were superseded by Marvin v. Marvin.  For more explanation, see infra note 51. 
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of eight “community property” states,25 where certain property 
acquired during a marriage is presumably dedicated to the 
maintenance of the relationship and is hence “community” 
property.26  Community property is owned equally by both 
spouses and is divided equally if the marriage is dissolved.27  
California’s community property system likely originated with 
the Visigoth tribes in Europe; it then moved to Spain and the 
Spanish territories and, finally, the United States.28  California, 
in its first Constitution of 1849, referred to a wife’s separate and 
community property rights for the first time.29  The following 
year, the California legislature enacted a statute that defined the 
contours of California community property law30—a statute that 
remains largely intact today.31 
 
 25 See GAIL BOREMAN BIRD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY 15 n.21 (2008).  Community property states include California, Arizona, Idaho, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas and Washington. Id.  Wisconsin is often 
considered the ninth community property state because it adopted a version of the 
Uniform Marital Property Act in 1986. Id.  See also Howard S. Erlanger & June M. 
Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property: Wisconsin’s Marital 
Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L REV. 769, 769 (1990). 
 26 Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 25. 
 27 Id. at 71 n.10.  In this regard, community property is an equitable system that 
protects the less affluent spouse’s interests, at least as compared to the common-law 
property system used in the vast majority of states.  One scholar suggests that in 
common-law property jurisdictions, property is divided at divorce as if the parties had 
never been married at all. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A 
Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 41, 87 (2008). 
 28 See supra note 25.  One scholar, in tracing community property back to warrior 
tribes such as the Visigoths, maintains the community property system promoted a type 
of marriage partnership, whereby “community property regimes . . . provide a way to 
recognize the contribution of both spouses to the success of the family unit.” Scalise, supra 
note 27. 
 29 BIRD, supra note 25, at 15–16.  For years in California, men were believed to 
control a married couple’s community property. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 25, at 
773 n.17 (explaining that until 1927, a wife only had an “expectancy interest” in 
community property because her husband had more meaningful control over her separate 
or community property).  Section 803 of the California Family Code, known colloquially as 
the Married Women’s Separate Property Presumption, provided that real or personal 
property held in a wife’s name alone, which was acquired via a written instrument before 
January 1, 1975, was presumed to be the wife’s separate property. CAL. FAM. CODE § 803 
(Deering 2010).  Currently, a husband’s and wife’s interests in community property are 
considered present, equal and existing. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (Deering 2010). 
 30 Kelly M. Cannon, Beyond the ‘Black Hole’—A Historical Perspective on 
Understanding the Non-Legislative History of Washington Community Property Law, 39 
GONZ. L. REV. 7, 14 (2004). 
 31 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 2010).  See also supra note 25.  For an early 
perspective on California’s community property system, see Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 
251–52 (Cal. 1859) (holding that “[t]he statute proceeds upon the theory that the 
marriage, in respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which 
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and 
possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution”).  California’s 
community property statute was so influential that Washington copied it nearly word-for-
word nineteen years later. Cannon, supra note 30, at 14–15. 
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B. California Courts Tackle Cohabitation Agreements 
Amid cohabitation’s growing popularity, the California Court 
of Appeal issued two rulings in a two-year period that oscillated 
between setting a clear standard for enforcing cohabitation 
agreements and expressing a disdain for nonmarital relation-
ships in general.32  In 1973, a California court applied marriage-
like property principles to a cohabitation case, revealing that the 
judiciary had an active and valid interest in enforcing 
cohabitants’ property rights.33  In In re Marriage of Cary, an 
unmarried couple lived together for more than eight years, had 
four children together, and held themselves out as married in all 
their financial and social dealings, although they were not legally 
married.34  When the male partner moved to dissolve the 
arrangement and divide the property, the trial court awarded his 
partner half of the marital property, and the appellate court 
subsequently affirmed the decision.35  According to the California 
Court of Appeal, three sections of the Family Law Act36 provided 
that each party should receive an equal distribution of the 
community property as if the couple had been validly married.37  
The Cary court clarified that “the Family Law Act applies not 
only to valid marriages.  It expressly covers a family relationship 
based on a void or voidable marriage where ‘either party or both 
parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.’”38  
The male partner argued that neither he nor his partner believed 
 
 32 See In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).  See also 
Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
 33 See Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 862.  While California courts had settled cohabitants’ 
property claims for years before Cary, the case is significant because it showed some of 
the social forces in motion that led to Marvin v. Marvin three years later, which was a 
landmark case in California property law. See infra note 51. 
 34 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863. 
 35 Id. at 863, 867.  In upholding the marriage-like relationship in this case, the Cary 
trial court essentially adopted a “de facto approach to marriage.” Ellen Kandoian, 
Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. 
L.J. 1829, 1847 n.75 (1987). 
 36 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000–5137 (Deering 2010).  Effective January 1, 1994, the 
Family Law Act sections of the California Civil Code were repealed and replaced with 
equivalent provisions in the California Family Code. Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Stepparent 
Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (1997). 
 37 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.  One scholar has opined, “Cary effectively asked: ‘Has 
this nonmarital family behaved like a marital family?  If so, why not apply our already 
well-developed family law?’” Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital 
Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME 
L.REV. 1265, 1293 (2001). 
 38 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865–66.  The Cary court likened the couple’s relationship 
to that of a “putative spouse,” a legal status that effectuates equitable property division 
when there is a good-faith belief in an otherwise invalid marriage. See CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 2251 (Deering 2010).  Other scholars have compared the Carys’ relationship to a 
common-law marriage, which California abolished in 1895. Charlotte K. Goldberg, The 
Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 487–88 (2007). 
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in good faith that their union was a valid marriage, and the 
Family Law Act did not address a scenario where the parties had 
no good-faith belief in the validity of their union—so the court 
should leave the parties where it found them.39 
The court disagreed, noting that Mr. Cary’s argument would 
force the Legislature to basically endorse deceit.40  A “spouse” 
who deceived his partner into believing they were married would 
get half of the community property, while two partners who 
already knew they were not validly married would be left to fend 
for themselves with no help from the courts.41  The Cary decision 
was significant because it elevated some cohabitants from just 
“living together” to a quasi-married status, affording those 
cohabitants the same community property protections as 
putative spouses.42  In its closing remarks, the Cary court 
explained how closely a cohabitation relationship had to resemble 
a marriage in order to gain enforcement from the courts: 
It should be pointed out that the criteria for application of the rule we 
apply to the case before us is much more than that of an unmarried 
living arrangement between a man and woman.  The Family Law Act 
obviously requires that there be established not only an ostensible 
marital relationship but also an actual family relationship, with 
cohabitation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual 
rights, duties, and obligations attending marriage.43 
Although the Family Law Act has since been repealed,44 the 
Cary court clearly threw its weight behind cohabitation 
relationships that approached, mimicked, or became nearly 
synonymous with marriage, and disdained cohabitation 
relationships that represented temporary, casual lifestyle 
choices.  But subsequent courts, including the California Court of 
Appeal just two years later, rejected Cary’s “marriage-like” 
 
 39 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.  The Family Law Act of 1970 ushered in California’s 
no-fault divorce regime, whereby spouses could seek a divorce based on “irreconcilable 
differences,” without having to prove the other spouse was responsible. Herma Hill Kay, 
An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 291 (1987).  
“Fault” was likewise not considered in spousal support and property-division awards. Id.  
By ascribing fault to both partners, Mr. Cary attempted to circumvent the Family Law 
Act, which provided relief in the (far more common) cases where one partner had a good-
faith belief that the marriage was valid but the other did not. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865. 
 40 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865. 
 41 Id. at 865–66. 
 42 Although the Carys lived together for a number of years, the court did not 
consider them to have a common-law marriage, nor was the decision based in any way on 
that prospect. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.  California abolished common-law marriage in 
1895. See infra note 129. 
 43 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867. 
 44 See supra note 36. 
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standard in favor of clear distinctions between cohabitation and 
marriage, and a firmer anti-cohabitation stance overall.45 
Two years later, a different California Court of Appeal cited 
precedent for taking a stricter view of cohabitation 
arrangements.46  In Beckman v. Mayhew, the court held that 
absent an agreement between the partners, a cohabiting partner 
would not automatically assume a share of the couple’s earnings, 
and thereby rejected the Cary court’s reliance on the then-valid 
Family Law Act.47  As the Beckman court noted: 
The Family Law Act deals with divisions of property at the 
termination of solemnized marriages and . . . at the termination of 
putative marriages.  Neither in terms nor by implication does it deal 
with non-marital family relationships of the kind involved in Vallera, 
Keene and the present case.48 
The Beckman decision was significant because it tightened 
the judicially-created rules for when a cohabiting partner could 
 
 45 See infra note 48. 
 46 Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).  The Beckman 
court’s “stricter view” of cohabitation relationships was not unilaterally grounded in 
precedent, however.  Notably, the Beckman court did not heed the precedent that Cary 
had set two years earlier, making the Beckman court’s reference to stare decisis a curious 
one indeed. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 607.  One scholar has suggested the Beckman court sympathized with the 
female partner’s plight but felt “constrained by precedent” in denying relief. Christina M. 
Fernandez, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359, 
363 n.14 (1978).  As the Beckman court noted, perhaps less elegantly, “[w]e are not 
permitted to violate stare decisis for the sake of straws in the wind.” Beckman, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. at 608.  The precedent relied upon by the Beckman court included Vallera v. 
Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 762–63 (Cal. 1943), and Keene v. Keene, 371 P.2d 329, 330 (Cal. 
1962), which held that cohabiting partners who knew they were not validly married to 
their partners (i.e., the opposite of putative spouses), did not earn the right to share in the 
couple’s earnings and accumulations simply by virtue of their cohabitation.  A written 
agreement would likely be a different matter.  In its decision, the Beckman court rejected 
not only Cary, but also In re Estate of Atherley, a case where a woman who lived with a 
married man for twenty-two years was awarded half of his estate.  The court found that 
she was entitled to the property because they had “cohabited, pooled resources, resided 
together continuously, contributed services to joint projects, and otherwise conducted 
business as if they were man and wife.” In re Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975).  The Atherley court agreed with Cary that a partner in a so-called “meretricious” 
relationship, who knew he or she was not actually married, deserved the same property 
rights as a putative spouse—those who do believe in good faith, but incorrectly, that they 
are married to their partners. Id. at 46–48.  The Atherley court, like Cary, grounded its 
decision in the Family Law Act.  The court cautioned that  
all meretricious relationships, however, do not automatically trigger this 
rule . . . the criteria for application of the rule . . . is much more than . . . an 
unmarried living arrangement between a man and woman.  The Family Law 
Act . . . requires . . . there be established not only an ostensible marital 
relationship but also an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and 
mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations 
attending marriage. 
Id. at 48. 
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expect to recover a share of the couple’s resources and injected a 
sense that unmarried relationships could create inequality 
between cohabitating partners.49  The Beckman court was 
reluctant to protect what it called “non-marital family 
relationship,” clarifying that its “descriptive term applies to a 
relationship which [many call] meretricious.”50 
C. The Advent of the Marvin Agreement 
Whatever concerns the California Court of Appeal had about 
cohabitation were blown away in 1976 when the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marvin v. Marvin set a standard for 
contractual agreements between intimate partners that still 
resonates today.51  In 1964, the actor Lee Marvin and his 
girlfriend Michelle Triola made an oral contract that, while they 
lived together, they would pool their earnings, share equally any 
property acquired during the relationship, and “hold themselves 
out to the general public as husband and wife.”52  Additionally, 
Triola agreed to furnish her services as a homemaker, 
 
 49 This view is supported by Justice Paras’ concurring opinion in Beckman, when he 
noted that the decision “promotes a public policy favoring legally binding marriages, with 
consequent sounder and more secure familial ties.  This public policy has not changed and 
should not change.” Beckman, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (Paras, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. at 605 n.1.  For one definition of “meretricious,” see Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 
44 n.6, which states that “a meretricious relationship exists if unmarried persons 
knowingly live together.”  Generally, “meretricious” is defined as “relating to 
prostitution,” but the term is also used to mean “unmarried persons knowingly live 
together,” as it does in Atherley. Eric Olsen, How Do Courts Divide Property Acquired 
During a Pseudomarital (Meretricious) Relationship? Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 
880, 812 P.2d 523 (1991), 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1091, 1091 n.1 (1992); Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
at 44 n.6.  Of the community property states, only Washington treats unmarried 
cohabitants as equivalent to marital spouses. Olsen, supra at 1092.  Arizona, New Mexico, 
Nevada, California and Wisconsin treat unmarried cohabitants as contractual partners 
and divide assets based on whatever agreement the parties had. Id. at 1902–93, 1096. 
 51 See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  Marvin added to the 
lexicon an enduringly popular but non-legal term, “palimony,” which puns on the support, 
or “alimony,” which one might pay to a cohabitant, or “pal,” rather than an ex-spouse.  
Some have questioned the case’s impact, noting that the available contractual and 
equitable remedies it endorsed were the same ones available beforehand. Ann Laquer 
Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2001).  “With all its 
celebrity, the Marvin decision stands more as a cultural icon than as a legal watershed.” 
Id. at 1383.  Indeed, Marvin did not clear up the question regarding which cohabitation 
agreements were enforceable.  There is a line of cases that involving same-sex 
partnership agreements that are uncommon in California and seem to have undergone 
greater judicial scrutiny compared to their opposite-sex partnership counterparts. See 
generally Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Whorton v. Dillingham, 
248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  See also infra note 68. 
 52 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.  Inasmuch as the Marvin-Triola agreement spelled out 
the financial terms of their union, at least one scholar would liken it to “first-degree 
promising,” an early stage along the relationship continuum that emphasizes the actors’ 
self-interested, economic well-being. Eric G. Andersen, Three Degrees of Promising, 2003 
BYU L. REV. 829, 832 (2003).  Second-degree and third-degree promising are 
comparatively more spiritual and less financial in nature. Id. at 832–33. 
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housekeeper, cook, and companion in exchange for Marvin’s 
agreement  to “provide for all of [Triola’s] financial support and 
needs for the rest of her life.”53  During the cohabitation, which 
lasted until May 1970, Marvin acquired significant amounts of 
property that included motion picture rights worth more than 
$1 million.54  The cohabitation ended when Marvin made Triola 
leave the residence in May 1970 after about a year and a half of 
financially supporting her.55  Marvin was married during much 
of his cohabitation with Triola, and his final divorce decree from 
Betty Marvin was not filed until January 1967.56  Triola sought 
declaratory relief to ascertain her contractual and property 
rights, and sought a constructive trust over half of the property 
the couple acquired during the cohabitation.57  Marvin claimed 
the agreement was unenforceable because their relationship was 
illicit, adulterous, and illegally promoted divorce.  He also 
analogized between their agreement and a breached promise to 
marry, noting that the promises were basically the same in the 
two agreements and a breached promise to marry was not 
actionable.58 
 
 53 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.  See also Brook, supra note 19, at 164 (disputing the 
contention that cohabiting partners have no duty to support one another financially). 
 54 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. 
 55 Id.  Oral agreements, such as the one in Marvin, present particular problems.  As 
one scholar points out: 
Unfortunately, few cohabiting couples make such express contracts.  Especially 
in states which limit the Marvin remedy to express agreements, this contract-
law approach invites outright perjury concerning an oral understanding, or 
what might be called quasi-perjury, by which one of the cohabitants, after the 
breakup of the couple, ‘recalls’ a conversation about their agreeing to share 
their lives together which he or she after-the-fact contorts (perhaps even in 
good faith) into a community-property type pooling contract. 
William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A 
Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1687 (1984).  After her 
relationship with Marvin ended, Triola began a cohabitation relationship with actor Dick 
Van Dyke that lasted until her death in 2009 at age seventy-five. Elaine Woo, Lawsuit 
Against Well-Known Actor Made Palimony a Fact of Life, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009, at 
C8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/31/ 
AR2009103102007.html.  In 1983, Triola told the press that she had a written contract 
with Van Dyke to avoid further legal problems. Id. 
 56 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 111. 
 57 Id. at 110–11. 
 58 Id. at 112–15.  Specifically, Marvin claimed his agreement with Triola and the 
typical breached promise to marry each included implied promises of support and pooled 
resources. Id.  Because an action based on a breached promise to marry was barred by 
section 43.5(d) of the Civil Code, an agreement (like Marvin and Triola’s) that included 
the same implied promises, but did not include a promise to marry, should not be 
actionable either. Id. at 115–16.  Marvin did not prevail on this line of reasoning, and the 
court noted that since the statute’s enactment in 1939, no lawyer had ever invoked that 
line of reasoning. Id. at 116.  Other courts have adopted the Marvin court’s conclusion 
that promises between unmarried partners that are independent of a breach of promise to 
marry are enforceable. See Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 976 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); 
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 908 (N.J. 1979) (noting that “[w]e do no more than 
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The court rejected each of Marvin’s claims and held that 
unmarried cohabitants could make and enforce contracts 
regarding earnings and property, although in this case, the court 
had found no agreement, express or otherwise, between Marvin 
and Triola.59  The court ruled that generally, agreements 
“expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of 
sexual services” were invalid, while relationships like the one in 
Marvin, which merely “contemplated” a nonmarital relationship, 
were valid and severable.60  Finally, the court rejected Cary’s 
reliance on the Family Law Act of 1970, deciding instead that 
courts and not the legislature should sort out property claims 
among cohabitants: “provisions of the Family Law Act do not 
govern the distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital 
relationship . . . [which] remains subject solely to judicial 
decision.”61 
 
recognize that society’s mores have changed, and that an agreement between adult 
parties living together is enforceable to the extent it is not based on a relationship 
proscribed by law, or on a promise to marry”). 
 59 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116.  Some sources suggest the Marvin decision reflected a 
newfound judicial tolerance of nontraditional family relationships, inasmuch as the 
decision declined to find the couple’s agreement based upon illegal consideration. See 
HARV. LAW REVIEW ASS’N, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: 
Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1713–14 (1977). 
 60 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113–14.  “Meretricious” has been defined several ways by 
California courts.  The Marvin court used “nonmarital” and “meretricious” 
interchangeably throughout the decision.  Other courts have found that “meretricious” 
simply means “of or relating to prostitution,” while acknowledging that other states have 
widened the definition to mean “unmarried cohabitants.” See Zoppa v. Zoppa, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 901, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  See also supra note 50. 
 61 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 106, 110.  Significantly, the Marvin court here used the term 
“nonmarital relationship” rather than “cohabitation,” possibly anticipating the questions 
about what qualified as “cohabitation.” Id.  In Cochran v. Cochran, Patricia Cochran 
(whose last name was changed to match with her boyfriend’s) sued her boyfriend and 
sometimes live-in lover—the late, infamous attorney Johnnie Cochran—for breach of a 
Marvin agreement. Cochran v. Cochran, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 900–01 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001).  Mr. Cochran moved for summary judgment on Ms. Cochran’s claim that he 
breached their Marvin agreement, arguing that he was not cohabiting with her when the 
agreement was made—the couple spent an average of two to four nights together per 
week. Id. at 902–05.  In denying Mr. Cochran’s motion, the court decided to 
save for another day the issue whether consenting adults need cohabit [sic] at 
all in order to enter an enforceable agreement regarding their earnings and 
property.  Assuming for discussion's sake that cohabitation is required, [the 
court] conclude[s] that the rationale of Marvin is satisfied in appropriate cases 
by a cohabitation arrangement that is less than full-time.  Here, as so 
construed, there was sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on the 
cohabitation element. 
Id. at 905. 
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III.  SAME-SEX PARTNERS AND MARVIN AGREEMENTS 
A. Jones v. Daly (1981) and Whorton v. Dillingham (1988) 
The Marvin case set a contractual standard62 for 
heterosexual couples that same-sex couples soon began to test.  
Despite the courts’ exclusive power to adjudicate Marvin 
agreements, California appellate courts did little to clarify the 
Marvin holding for same-sex couples.63  In essence, courts have 
determined that same-sex cohabitation agreements are 
enforceable when they include agreements for services separate 
from the “cohabitation state.”64  However, courts have not fully 
defined which activities are or are not naturally part of the 
 
 62 Not every commentator looks favorably upon contractual relationships between 
intimate partners. JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION: SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 81 (2002) (stating that it “connotes a 
worldview in which the accretion of social obligation is dissolved in the intentional 
arrangements of the autonomous individual of the marketplace”). 
 63  See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Whorton v. 
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).  While Marvin likened 
“meretricious” relationships to prostitution, other courts (like Zoppa) have defined 
“meretricious” relationships simply as those between unmarried, committed partners. See 
supra note 60; Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3d 552, 555 (Wash. 2007) (holding that “[a] 
‘meretricious relationship’ is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit 
with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist”).  In Gormley v. 
Robertson, a Washington appellate court, in holding that the meretricious relationship 
doctrine was applicable to same-sex couples, noted that: 
[A] same-sex relationship cannot be a meretricious relationship because such 
persons do not have a ‘quasi-marital’ relationship . . . .  Because persons of the 
same sex cannot legally marry, they are ‘not entitled to the rights and 
protections of a quasi-marriage, such as community property-like 
treatment . . . .  But it is of no consequence to the cohabitating couple, same-sex 
or otherwise, whether they can legally marry.  Indeed, one of the key elements 
of a meretricious relationship is knowledge by the partners that a lawful 
marriage between them does not exist. . . .  [Although] the ability of same-sex 
couples to legally marry is for the legislature to decide, . . . the rule that courts 
must ‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations 
and make a just and equitable disposition of the property’ is a judicial, not a 
legislative, extension of the rights and protections of marriage to intimate, 
unmarried cohabitants. 
Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1045–46 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  Delaware courts 
have used “meretricious” to refer to a married person cohabiting with an unmarried 
person. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 104 A.2d 463, 464–64 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954).  
Meanwhile, some courts seem unsure of how to classify unmarried same-sex cohabitants.  
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that a “live-in lover” statute 
permitting modification of alimony does not apply to a same-sex lover. See Van Dyck v. 
Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853, 854–55 (Ga. 1993).  Similarly, an Alabama court found that 
while alimony can be terminated when a spouse is living with an opposite-sex partner, the 
termination clause does not apply to a same-sex lover. See J.L.M. v. S.A.K., 18 So.3d 384, 
388–89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). 
 64 Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409–10.  Despite the court’s careful explanation about 
compensable services, the court in Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) suggested that homemaking services were not the operative factor in Whorton, 
which suggests that the Jones agreement failed because of the explicit reference to 
serving as a “lover.” See infra note 69.  See also Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 130–31. 
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cohabitation state, thus leaving open the question which services 
make a cohabitation contract enforceable.  For example, in 
Jones v. Daly, one same-sex partner sued for declaratory relief 
entitling him to half of his deceased partner’s estate.65  Three 
months into their relationship, the pair made an oral agreement 
that they would combine their earnings and efforts, share any 
and all property, “hold themselves out to the public at large as 
cohabiting mates, and [plaintiff] would render his services as a 
lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper 
and cook.”66  In return, the decedent agreed to support the 
plaintiff financially for the rest of the plaintiff’s life, an 
arrangement that lasted until the decedent’s death 
approximately two years later.67 
The California appellate court dismissed the plaintiff’s action 
for declaratory relief and sustained the defendant’s demurrer to 
the complaint, finding that the cohabitation agreement was 
inescapably based upon the couple’s sexual relationship.68 
The court noted that “[n]either the property sharing nor the 
support provision of the agreement rests upon plaintiff’s acting 
 
 65 Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 130–31. 
 66 Id. at 131–33 (noting that sexual services were an inseparable part of the 
consideration for the contract). 
 67 Id. at 131. 
 68 Id. at 134.  See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme 
Court’s Grand Tradition of Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 205 n.89 (2008) 
(noting that the Jones agreement foundered because it explicitly referred to the same-sex 
couple as “lovers”); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 
YALE L.J. 997, 1103 n.473 (1985) (indicating that the Jones court’s conclusion that sexual 
services could not be severed from the other services under the agreement was essentially 
the same as the conclusion in Marvin, despite the court’s attempt to distinguish Jones 
from Marvin).  Looking at the Marvin decision in terms of Jones, it is unclear what made 
Triola’s services severable where Jones’ were not, other than the gender of the parties 
involved.  One possibility is that homosexual relationships are, fair or not, considered to 
be based primarily on sex.  In Lawrence v. Texas, a landmark 2003 case that struck down 
Texas’ anti-sodomy law, Justice O’Connor suggested that Texas’ law was based on the 
presumption that same-sex intimate relationships were irreducibly based on sex: 
[B]ecause Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, 
consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval 
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior . . . .  Texas 
argues, however, that the sodomy law does not discriminate against 
homosexual persons.  Instead, the State maintains that the law discriminates 
only against homosexual conduct.  While it is true that the law applies only to 
conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated 
with being homosexual.  Under such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is 
targeted at more than conduct.  It is instead directed toward gay persons as a 
class. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence, inasmuch as it goes right to the sexual question, echoes the viewpoint Justice 
O’Connor criticized.  His dissent frames Lawrence in terms of a “fundamental right” to 
engage in homosexual sodomy, as noted in the Bowers v. Hardwick decision some 
seventeen years prior. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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as [decedent’s] traveling companion, housekeeper or cook as 
distinguished from acting as his lover.  The latter service forms 
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and 
renders it unenforceable in its entirety.”69 
Seven years later, the California Court of Appeal found that 
a cohabitation agreement was enforceable when the services in 
question included bodyguard, business partner, chauffeur, and 
secretary.70  The court reasoned that those services were separate 
from the sexual relationship and thus comprised separate 
consideration for the agreement.71  The court reached that result 
although the sexual services were an express part of a same-sex 
couple’s cohabitation agreement, unlike the agreements in 
Marvin and Jones.72  Distinguishing its holding from the Jones 
decision, the Whorton court found that “Jones is factually 
different in that the complaining party did not allege contracting 
to provide services apart from those normally incident to the 
state of cohabitation itself.”73  In contrast, the Whorton couple 
had an agreement that included for-pay and gratuitous services, 
where they were severable and able to serve as consideration for 
their agreement.74  Basically, California appellate courts have 
 
 69 Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 134.  Nonmarital agreements that “facilitate adultery” 
were considered so immoral that nothing, even a written agreement, could make them 
enforceable. See McCall v. Frampton, 438 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).  To 
mitigate the illegal or immoral nature of the cohabitation contract, an agreement had to 
include non-domestic services that could form an independent basis for the contract, 
allowing the non-sexual services to be severed from the sexual ones. See id. at 13 (finding 
that “where the [cohabitation] agreement consists in part of an unlawful objective and in 
part of lawful objectives, under certain circumstances the illegality may be severed and 
the legal components enforced”).  Despite the Marvin court’s assertion that domestic 
services comprised lawful and adequate consideration, the Jones plaintiff failed to 
recover. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr at 134. 
 70 Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 71 Id. at 408–09. 
 72 Id. at 408. 
 73 Id. at 410.  The court here may be referencing the “lovers” issue raised by 
Braucher. See supra note 68.  Denying relief to the Jones plaintiff for, essentially, 
cohabitating is curious because he was as close to married as he could get in the days 
before domestic partnerships.  As one commentator said of the decision, “The Jones 
holding makes even less sense than holdings declining enforcement in a heterosexual 
context, since in the context of homosexual cohabitation no option to marry exists.” 
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State 
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 286 n.305 (1982). 
 74 The Whorton court explained that the chauffeur and business partner duties were 
“significantly different than those household duties normally attendant to nonbusiness 
cohabitation and are those for which monetary compensation ordinarily would be 
anticipated.” Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410.  But, over time, California courts changed 
their stance on homemaking services functioning as consideration for a Marvin 
agreement.  Nearly twenty years after Whorton, the California Court of Appeal said of 
contracts that centered on one party’s homemaking services: 
[A] ‘promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a lawful and 
adequate consideration for a contract . . . otherwise those engaged in domestic 
employment could not sue for their wages . . . .’  Marvin expressly rejected the 
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determined that same-sex cohabitation agreements are 
enforceable when they include “for-pay” services, but it is unclear 
which services are for-pay and which are not, and whether 
domestic duties should qualify as paid services, or are simply an 
expected part of a sexual relationship. 
B. Same-Sex Cohabitants and the Severability Problem 
The enforceability of cohabitation agreements is particularly 
important for California’s same-sex couples, who have a major 
stake in such agreements,75 because same-sex couples cannot 
legally marry in California.76  Shortly after the Marvin decision, 
the California Legislature drew a sharp distinction between 
heterosexual and same-sex couples when it amended section 300 
of the California Family Code to exclude same-sex partners from 
entering a lawful marriage.77  That distinction was reinforced in 
2000 when California voters approved Proposition 22, which 
likewise restricted California to recognizing only marriages 
between a man and a woman.78  Same-sex couples had gained 
 
argument that the partner seeking to enforce the contract must have 
contributed either property or services additional to ordinary homemaking 
services. 
Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 75 At least one critic argues that same-sex marriage might restrict same-sex couples’ 
freedom rather than enhance it. See David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal 
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 447, 487 (1996).  See also Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, 
Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 107 (Robert Wintemute et al. eds., 2001) (interpreting Chambers’ 
ideas to mean “the danger to gay liberty [from marriage] is mitigated by the increasing 
availability of antenuptual agreements and other contractual inroads on marriage as a 
rigidly state-defined status”). 
 76 The California Family Code states that “only marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010).  
However, same-sex couples can register as domestic partners, a status that confers many 
of the same rights and privileges as those of marriage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (Deering 
2010). 
 77 Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 468 n.11 (Cal. 2004) (finding that 
“the language in Family Code section 300 specifying that marriage is a relation ‘between 
a man and a woman’ was adopted by the Legislature in 1977, when the provision was set 
forth in former section 4100 of the Civil Code . . . .  The legislative history of the measure 
makes its objective clear”). 
 78 Proposition 22, passed in 2000 but struck down by the California Supreme Court 
in May 2008, added section 308.5 to the California Family Code, which defined legal 
marriage as only between a man and a woman. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010).  
See also Bird, supra note 25, at 203.  Some scholars have argued that section 308.5 merely 
clarified which out-of-state marriages California would recognize, and thereby did not 
affect the possibility of same-sex marriage within California, since the section was part of 
section 308 of the California Family Code, “validity of foreign marriages.” See Enrique A. 
Monagas, California’s Assembly Bill 205, the Domestic Partner Rights and 
Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation Compromising the Campaign 
for Marriage Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 46–47 (2006). 
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only a limited form of recognition in 1999, when the California 
Legislature enabled same-sex couples to register as domestic 
partners.79  While the rights domestic partners enjoy echo some 
of the protections that traditional married couples enjoy,80 some 
note, accurately, that domestic partnerships are not the 
functional equivalent of marriage for same-sex couples.81  Others 
have argued that the registration requirements for domestic 
partner-ships will invalidate already-existing Marvin 
agreements.82  And, whether a same-sex couple has opted for 
their lone “marriage” option may well determine whether one 
partner can enforce a cohabitation agreement in today’s post-
Proposition 8 political landscape.83 
 
 79 Section 297 of the California Family Code defines domestic partners as “two 
adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed 
relationship of mutual caring.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Deering 2010).  To qualify, the 
partners must file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State, and 
must meet the following requirements: 1) Each partner is at least eighteen years of age; 
2) they share a common residence; 3) neither partner is married to or involved in an 
active domestic partnership with anyone else; 4) the partners are not related by blood in a 
way that would disallow them from marrying otherwise; and 5) they are of the same sex 
or one or both partners is over the age of sixty-two. Id. 
 80 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5 (Deering 2010). 
 81 See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that by creating domestic partnerships, the Legislature had not created same-sex 
marriage by a different name thereby rejecting the argument that domestic partnership is 
the functional equivalent of marriage).  In fact, domestic partners do not receive a number 
of marital rights and benefits.  For example, they may not file federal joint tax returns 
and they are not entitled to numerous benefits provided to married couples by the federal 
government, such as marital benefits relating to Social Security, Medicare, federal 
housing, food stamps, veterans’ benefits, military benefits, and federal employment 
benefit laws. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE 
OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d04353r.pdf.  The Knight court went on to highlight other differences between 
domestic partnerships and traditional marriage: minors may marry with parental consent 
but cannot become domestic partners, heterosexual prisoners may marry but their 
homosexual counterparts may not become domestic partners, domestic partnerships are 
much more easily dissolved than marriages, and, unlike traditional marriage, domestic 
partnerships may not be recognized by other states, nor may other states recognize 
domestic partners’ rights to visit their hospitalized partner and to make medical decisions 
for him or her.  The court concluded, “The numerous dissimilarities between the two types 
of unions disclose that the Legislature has not created a ‘same-sex marriage’ under the 
guise of another name” (citations omitted). Id.  See also Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner 
Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2004) (“[D]omestic partnership legislation may be surer and 
less socially divisive than constitutionally compelled same-sex marriage or civil 
union . . . [but] the choice is not society’s or the state’s to make.  Only gay men and 
lesbians can choose to forgo ultimate rights in favor of a surer, but lesser, alternative.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 82 See Monagas, supra note 78, at 50 (explaining that Assembly Bill 205 could void 
same-sex couples’ cohabitation agreements once those couples seek to register with the 
state as domestic partners). 
 83 See infra Part IV.C and note 113.  Some commentators noted in the wake of 
Marvin that marriage as a concept was in flux, and courts were backing away from 
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Historically, gender has not impacted couples’ abilities to 
enforce cohabitation agreements, as courts have not considered 
the gender of the parties when determining the enforceability of 
a cohabitation agreement.84  Rather, the relative severability of 
the sexual relationship—the extent to which the sexual 
relationship can be considered separately from the other bases 
for the agreement—has been determinative in the enforceability 
of cohabitation agreements, a point emphasized by the Marvin 
court.85  The underlying assumption in Marvin and its progeny, 
which includes Jones and Whorton, is that sexual relations are 
an implicit aspect of an intimate relationship, and sex is one of 
the things an intimate partner is expected to provide for his or 
her partner.86  Accordingly, an agreement where one partner’s 
sexual performance makes up most or all of that partner’s 
consideration under the contract would be an illegal contract and 
void as against public policy.87  However, if a court determines 
that the sexual relationship is tangential to the agreement, then 
the agreement can be upheld.88  A California court confronted 
with a Marvin-type agreement that implicitly or explicitly 
includes sexual relations has the option to sever the sexual 
relationship—which represents illicit consideration—from the 
other services in the contract, and uphold the rest.89  In deciding 
 
defining it. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. J. 441, 442 
(1976). 
 84 However, the Jones decision casts some doubt upon this conclusion. See supra note 
66. 
 85 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976). 
 86 Id.  But see Hall v. Duster, 727 So. 2d 834, 837 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that 
“[s]exual relations between the parties is not an indispensable element of cohabitation”). 
 87 Just as the Marvin court’s rationale has been questioned in light of Jones, so too 
has the Marvin court’s view of the illegality of sexual services in a cohabitation 
agreement. See William Van Alstyne, The Unbearable Lightness of Marriage in the 
Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court: Altered States in Constitutional Law, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 61, 72 n.53 (2009) (arguing that “[cohabitation] agreements were 
formerly void on public policy grounds (akin to contracts of prostitution or meretricious 
criminal cohabitation).  But nonmarital cohabitation is currently not merely lawful in 
most jurisdictions, rather, it is on its way to becoming a protected civil right”). 
 88 California courts have held for years that cohabiting adults may have an ongoing 
sexual relationship, even a meretricious one, at the time they make a property agreement 
and still make an enforceable contract. See Bridges v. Bridges, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1954).  In Alderson v. Alderson, the court held that a relationship based on 
“many . . . things,” including but not limited to sex, was not a relationship expressly based 
on meretricious considerations. 225 Cal. Rptr 610, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).  The 
petitioner’s consideration for the contract was being respondent’s wife and doing 
“whatever a wife does,” not just sex. Id. 
 89 See Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating that 
“although Civil Code section 1599 authorizes a court to sever the illegal object of a 
contract from the legal[,] it does not require the court to do so”).  See also Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he doctrine of severance 
attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an 
illegal scheme [where t]he overarching inquiry is whether ‘the interests of 
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whether to enforce a contract with illegal and legal elements, the 
court must be guided by equitable considerations.90  In sum, 
California courts have held that the enforceability of a 
cohabitation agreement, for same-sex or opposite-sex couples 
alike, depends upon the degree to which the agreement 
contemplates one party furnishing sexual services as 
consideration; the less this is so, the more enforceable the 
agreement becomes.91  This gender-neutral view has led some 
commentators to call California’s enforcement of cohabitation 
agreements a “pure contract” approach.92 
IV.  WHAT LIES AHEAD:  THE CHANGING FACE OF THE MARVIN 
AGREEMENT 
A. California Courts May Treat Same-Sex Agreements 
Differently Post-Proposition 8 
Although California courts have been gender-disinterested, 
the trend could change in light of Proposition 8, despite the 
courts’ attempt to claim otherwise.93  A “Marvin agreement,” as 
used here, is a gender-irrelevant term.94  However, prior to 
Proposition 8, California courts upheld many of the Marvin-type 
cohabitation agreements under a public-policy regime that, while 
defining the allowable limits of same-sex relationships, had done 
so in a way that provoked much less controversy than the 
 
justice . . . would be furthered’ by severance.”) (citation omitted).  Cf. Marathon Entm’t v. 
Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 753 (Cal. 2008) (echoing Yoo that courts have the power but not the 
duty to sever illegal aspects of a contract). 
 90 See Yoo, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 751.  See also Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 
93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)  (holding that despite equitable considerations, petitioner did not 
deserve to have the legal and illegal aspects of her Marvin agreement severed because 
“[e]quity does not demand acceptance of the most favorable set of multiple conflicting 
versions of the facts set forth by a party in her pleadings”). 
 91 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114–15 (Cal. 1976). 
 92 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979). 
 93 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 76 (Cal. 2009) (finding that “Proposition 8 
reasonably must be interpreted in a limited fashion as eliminating only the right of same-
sex couples to equal access to the designation of marriage, and as not otherwise affecting 
the constitutional right of those couples to establish an officially recognized family 
relationship”). 
 94 Notably, the Marvin decision uses gender-neutral language throughout, referring 
to “nonmarital partners” rather than “man” and “woman,” which has led some to conclude 
the court felt Marvin applied equally to same-sex couples. See Sharmila Roy Grossman, 
Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin v. Marvin for the Same-Sex Couple Versus the 
Preferable Canadian Alternative—M. v. H., 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 547, 550 (2002); Rebecca L. 
Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and 
Evolving Definitions of “Family,” 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 512 (1990–1991).  More likely, the 
Marvin court’s language reflected a desire to erase gender from its decision rather than 
surreptitiously beckon to same-sex couples, considering the pure contractual approach of 
California courts described in Hewitt. 
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Proposition 8 debate that polarized the California community.95  
It is important to realize that, while California has moved away 
from bringing gender to its discussion of cohabitation 
agreements,96 or other rights that have been granted to 
homosexual partners,97 the state’s courts have also not faced a 
spate of Marvin agreements under the current public policy that 
the marriage designation is reserved solely for a man and a 
woman.98  California courts have already reflected in their 
decisions the electorate’s will that same-sex relationships cannot 
enjoy traditional marriage.99  Until and unless the Legislature 
clarifies same-sex couples’ cohabiting rights, California courts 
will probably have to shape the contours of cohabitants’ property 
rights, in terms of what the Legislature and voters have already 
decided.100 
 
 95 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/ 
politics/06marriage.html.  Some have argued that California’s Proposition 8 electorate 
was a unique population, where African American voters voted for Proposition 8’s ban on 
same-sex marriage in much greater numbers than Latino voters. See Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1523, 1535 (2009) 
(estimating that seventy percent of African American voters and fifty-three percent of 
Latino voters supported Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriage).  The measure passed 
by a fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent margin overall and a majority of white voters 
did not vote for it. See Joe Von Kanel & Hal Quinley, Exit Polls: Gay Marriage in CA, 
CNNPOLITICS (Nov. 5, 2008, 12:25 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/11/05/ 
exit-polls-gay-marriage-in-california/.  Others have argued that black voters did not cause 
Proposition 8 to pass, and have derided the so-called “scapegoating” of blacks stemming 
from the vote. See, e.g., Jennifer Holladay & Catherine Smith, A Cautionary Tale: The 
Obama Coalition, Anti-Subordination Principles and Proposition 8, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 
819, 828 (2009). 
 96 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116.  See also Grossman, supra note 94. 
 97 See Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 at 78 (holding that “although Proposition 8 changes the 
state Constitution . . . in all other respects same-sex couples retain the same substantive 
protections embodied in the state constitutional rights of privacy and due process as those 
accorded to opposite-sex couples and the same broad protections under the state equal 
protection clause”). 
 98 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010).  See also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75. 
 99 See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75.  The Strauss decision was careful to note that 
Proposition 8 simply reserved the designation “marriage” for unions between one man and 
one woman, and did not affect “the constitutional right to establish an officially 
recognized family relationship with the person of one’s choice.” Id. at 74. 
 100 For commentary on the courts’ role as interpreters, not progenitors, of policy, see 
Vierra v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that the “[courts’] function is not to make policy, but to interpret the law as it is 
written”).  See also Cal. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927 
P.2d 1175, 1177 (Cal. 1997) (“[T]he judicial role in a democratic society is fundamentally 
to interpret laws, not to write them.  The latter power belongs primarily to the people and 
the political branches of government.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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B. Hewitt v. Hewitt and the Role of Public Policy in Marvin 
Agreements 
Those courts will someday have to answer a question 
unfathomable in 1976: should same-sex couples even have the 
right to make enforceable Marvin agreements?  That the answer 
is probably “yes” obscures the real point, which is that the 
question can even be posed.  That question was not in play in 
1981 for Jones,101 nor in 1988 for Whorton,102  but it is in play 
now because of California’s newly-reiterated public policy 
defining the limits of same-sex relationships.103  While it is 
difficult to predict the success of a same-sex Marvin agreement in 
the wake of Proposition 8, California courts have already made 
clear that opposite-sex cohabitation relationships enjoy limited 
recognition rights.104  It is easy to assume a California court, 
confronted with a same-sex Marvin agreement at some future 
date, would enforce the agreement by the same guidelines 
dictated by Jones or Whorton, as vague as those might be.105  Yet, 
the playing field is different now than it was then, insofar as 
California voters decisively enacted their own public policy 
regarding same-sex relationships through the Proposition 8 
campaign and ballot measure.  Consequently, it is perhaps too 
easy to assume California courts will tune out public policy in 
making future decisions about same-sex couples—up to and 
including enforcement of Marvin agreements.106 
To ascertain how California courts might treat a same-sex 
Marvin case after Proposition 8, it is instructive to see how other 
states treat Marvin agreements, considering that same-sex 
marriage ballot initiatives have appeared on thirty-one state 
 
 101 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 102 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 103 Proposition 8 was called the “Marriage Protection Act,” which relates to the 
similar Illinois legislation defining the rights and responsibilities of married partners at 
issue in Hewitt. See infra note 106. 
 104 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988).  In Elden, an unmarried 
cohabitant sued to recover damages resulting from the death of his partner in a car 
accident, arguing their committed cohabitation relationship resembled a marriage. Id. at 
582–83.  The court declined to equate their cohabitation with a marriage, noting that “the 
state has a strong interest in the marriage relationship; to the extent unmarried 
cohabitants are granted the same rights as married persons, the state's interest in 
promoting marriage is inhibited.” Id. at 586. 
 105 See supra note 74. 
 106 In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Hewitt v. Hewitt that an opposite-sex 
cohabitation agreement was invalid.  What was notable about the decision was the court’s 
acknowledgement that public policy had played a role in its decision, inasmuch as 
strengthening marriage was the purpose of the then-recently enacted Illinois Marriage 
and Dissolution of Marriage Act. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979). 
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ballots, including California’s, and lost each time.107  The closest 
analogy to California’s post-Proposition 8 public policy is Illinois, 
whose Supreme Court decided a cohabitation case three years 
after Marvin that continues to affect cohabiting couples there 
regardless of gender.108  In Hewitt v. Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that the cohabitation agreement in question was 
unenforceable because agreements with sexual relations (of any 
level, presumably) as an explicit consideration were invalid 
under Illinois law.109  The court also held that the agreement 
violated public policy; to wit, enforcing the agreement would 
mean endorsing a nonmarital relationship at odds with the 
state’s public policy promoting marriage.110  The first part of the 
holding is typical of other states’ decisions, including California’s, 
although in California sexual relations can be part of the 
agreement as long as they are not an inseparable aspect.111  The 
second part of the holding is significant, not because the Illinois 
court disfavored the agreement but why: the court cited public 
policy grounds for declining to enforce a contract between two 
consenting adults, thereby augmenting (if not outright replacing) 
contract law with public policy.112 
 
 107 Glenn Adams & David Crary, Maine Voters Reject Same-Sex Marriage Law, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/56583.  Same-sex marriage 
initiatives have appeared on thirty-one state ballots, with all thirty-one states voting to 
ban or otherwise restrict same-sex marriage.  The states include: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, 
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, http://pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-
Homosexuality/State-Policies-on-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).  One 
factor in Proposition 8’s success in California was the relative ease with which the 
California Constitution could be amended.  The California Constitution is far easier to 
amend than its federal counterpart, while the state constitutions of Connecticut and 
Iowa—two states that offer same-sex marriage—cannot be amended through the 
initiative process. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64 (Cal. 2009). 
 108 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1208.  It bears noting that Hewitt involved an opposite-sex 
relationship, but the general policy points are instructive.  “It is generally agreed that 
Hewitt in no small measure was decided in light of, and perhaps in response to, 
Marvin . . . nearly all reported cases from other jurisdictions since 1979 fall somewhere in 
between, and most cite, as persuasive authority, one or the other.” Richard A. Wilson, The 
State of the Law of Protecting and Securing the Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois 
Without Benefit of Statutory Rights Accorded Heterosexual Couples, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
323, 323 n.62 (2007). 
 109 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1208. 
 110 Id.  See also Wilson, supra note 108, at 337, 335 (arguing that the pro-marriage 
public policy that dictated Hewitt also continues to foreclose same-sex couples’ Marvin 
rights, although Wilson notes that Illinois does not offer same-sex couples a domestic 
partnership option). 
 111 Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 112 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209. 
Do Not Delete 3/17/2011 12:24 AM 
2011] The Yellow Brick Road to Nowhere 505 
Since Hewitt is not a gender-based decision, it’s rationale 
could be adopted by a state that has a strong public policy 
against unmarried, unregistered113 same-sex couples entering 
into a marriage-like relationship—a state like California.114  To 
return to the question that started this section, then, should 
same-sex couples even have their Marvin agreements enforced, 
and if so, how?  Clearly, if Marvin agreements are to be enforced 
at all, they must be available to, and subject to the same 
requirements for, same-sex couples as well as their opposite-sex 
counterparts, or else equal protection issues will arise.115  More 
difficult is deciding how to enforce Marvin rights to ensure 
consistency and fairness.  The answer lies in legislation, federal 
or state, with the caveat that state legislation in this regard is 
susceptible to repeal.116 
 
 113 Here, “unregistered” means same-sex couples that have opted not to become 
domestic partners.  The logic is that same-sex couples that have not taken advantage of 
the most “marriage-like” relationship still sanctioned by the state may be at the mercy of 
a pro-marriage (or failing that, pro-domestic partner) public policy similar to Hewitt.  An 
unmarried, unregistered same-sex partner, by asking a court to enforce a nonmarital 
cohabitation contract, is asking the court on some level to recognize and protect that 
partner’s interest in a type of relationship contrary to public policy. 
 114 See Wilson, supra note 108, at 339–40 (arguing that the Hewitt could be applied to 
a same-sex cohabitation agreement).  The author noted: 
Although the holding in Hewitt is in fact cognizant of the gender of the parties 
and the availability of marriage to them, it depends upon neither . . . Illinois 
courts would not enforce what in effect are private contracts for marriage-like 
relationships . . . [b]ecause [Hewitt’s] holding is not dependent upon the gender 
of the parties being different (or “opposite sex”), its applicability is likely not so 
restricted either.  Such contracts between unmarried, same-sex couples likely 
cannot withstand a challenge raising Hewitt as a defense. 
Wilson, supra note 108, at 339–40.  California’s same-sex cohabitation agreements are 
vulnerable to Wilson’s warning about Hewitt because Proposition 8 parallels the 
comparable Illinois legislation in making a strong statement about public policy. See 
Maine Voters Repeal Gay-Marriage Law, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 4, 2009, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33609492/ns/politics-more_politics/.  See also State Policies 
on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 107.  Subsequently, other states’ voters have approved 
ballot measures banning same-sex marriage.  For example, Maine’s vote to repeal same-
sex marriage was surprising not only because Maine is a relatively progressive state, but 
also because the November 3, 2009 vote marks the first time an electorate has rejected a 
same-sex-marriage measure enacted by a legislature.  All of the previously-rejected same-
sex marriage initiatives had been put forth by courts. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63–
64 (Cal. 2009).  When even legislative pronouncements can be whisked away by voters, 
California’s “pure contractual” approach may only be a ballot measure away from 
extinction. 
 115 Inasmuch as requiring any additional requirements for same-sex couples, Marvin 
agreements would impose special hardships not experienced by similarly-situated 
opposite-sex partners, thereby triggering equal protection issues. See Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 116 See Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d, at 1209; Wilson, supra note 108, at 336. 
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C. The Need for Legislative Recognition of Same-Sex 
Cohabiting Couples 
If same-sex cohabiting partners wish to have their Marvin 
agreements consistently enforced, free from the vagaries of state 
electorates and courts and without the public-policy sword of 
Damocles117 hanging over their heads, they might pin their hopes 
on federal legislation.118  However, two obstacles exist that, if 
taken together, may render the option of federal intervention 
moot.  First, and most significantly, if Congress has the authority 
to regulate cohabitation agreements, then the issue becomes one 
of federal law, not state law.  However, Marvin agreements are 
essentially contracts, a subject that is typically the domain of 
state courts.119  In this regard, hoping for federal intervention is 
something of a Catch-22.120  Second, if marriage is solely a state 
question, many states (like California) do not support same-sex 
relationships, thus either disallow same-sex marriages or fail to 
offer domestic partnerships, or both.121  It is possible that states 
that offer neither same-sex marriage nor domestic partnerships 
will nevertheless enforce Marvin agreements; however, as Hewitt 
illustrates, public policy lurks in the background of nonmarital 
 
 117 Defined as “an impending disaster,” this idiom (first recorded in 1747) refers to 
the legend of Damocles, a courtier to King Dionysius.  The king, tired of Damocles’ 
incessant flattery, seated Damocles in a chair over which hung a sword suspended by a 
single hair to impress upon Damocles the precariousness of his position. THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 629 (Christine Ammer ed., 1997). 
 118 When states’ voters are 31-for-31 in rejecting same-sex marriage initiatives, and 
Maine voters make history by overturning a legislatively-produced same-sex marriage 
law, it seems that federal intervention is not only warranted, but necessary.  But see infra 
note 126.  Such federal recognition would take the form of a statute, but it would have to 
clear several hurdles that are discussed in Part V.B. 
 119 Federal courts acquire jurisdiction in cases that present a federal question under 
the Constitution or federal law, or cases where the parties are from different states and 
more than $75,000 is at issue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2006).  By this definition, 
most cohabitation agreements will be relegated to state court. 
 120 The term “Catch-22,” first coined in Joseph Heller’s 1961 novel of the same name, 
is defined as “[a] situation in which a desired outcome or solution is impossible to attain 
because of a set of inherently illogical rules or conditions.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 292–93 (4th ed. 2000).  See also THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS, supra note 117, at 108. 
 121 As of November 5, 2009, thirty-five states offered neither same-sex marriage nor 
domestic partnerships.  Same-sex marriage is currently available in Connecticut, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and most recently New Hampshire, where same-sex 
marriage has been legal since the beginning of 2010. Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage 
Legal in Six States, STATELINE.ORG (June 4, 2009; 4:40 PM), http://www.stateline.org/live/ 
details/story?contentId=347390.  Domestic partnerships (also called civil unions) are 
available in some form in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin, plus the District of Columbia. 
FREEDOMTOMARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states.php (last visited Nov. 10, 
2010). 
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relationship questions.122  Third, and most troubling, federal 
legislation has effectively foreclosed meaningful recognition of 
same-sex cohabitating relationships.  It not only defines 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but also 
allows states to refuse to recognize a “marriage” performed in 
any other state, thereby ensuring that “marriage” will mean 
whatever the enforcing state wants it to mean.123  Thus, in many 
states, unmarried couples must overcome the presumption that 
their relationships are unworthy of protection because public 
policy favors a marriage relationship—the same point made in 
Hewitt.124 
Despite the Maine debacle,125 state legislation is a more 
promising option for same-sex cohabiting couples, particularly in 
a state like California that already recognizes same-sex couples 
through domestic partnerships.126  The first step in devising 
proposed legislation is to understand the contours of the issue; in 
California, the Jones case showed that same-sex cohabiting 
 
 122 Public policy does not always weigh in on Marvin decisions, perhaps because such 
agreements—particularly among same-sex couples—are comparatively rare.  But Hewitt 
is an example of how a court can look at a Marvin decision through a public-policy lens, 
without promising results.  States vary widely in their treatment of cohabitation 
contracts.  A sampling shows that Georgia, Illinois and Louisiana hold such agreements 
unenforceable due to their immoral nature.  In contrast, Kansas, Washington and West 
Virginia require no formal or implied agreement, oral or written, but ask only that the 
partners have lived together for some period of time in a stable domestic relationship.  
Texas and Minnesota (to some degree) require express agreements to satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds, while others, including Michigan, New Hampshire, New York and North 
Dakota require express agreements and will not enforce implied contracts.  In states 
where cohabitation agreements are not subject to the Statute of Frauds, including 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida and North Carolina, courts tend to follow the Marvin rationale 
of enforcing agreements that are not based upon sexual considerations, or at least have 
considerations other than sexual services.  Furthermore, some states, such as Arizona, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey and Wisconsin, recognize implied 
agreements. William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of Law Problems Arising When Unmarried 
Cohabitants Change Domicile, 55 SMU L. REV. 273, 275–90 (2002). 
 123 The federal Defense of Marriage Act, passed in 1996, announces itself as “an Act 
to define and protect the institution of marriage.” Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-199, § 1738C, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996).  Under the heading “Powers Reserved to 
the States,” the Act provides that: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship. . . .  [T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to 
a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 
Defense of Marriage Act § 1738C. 
 124 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). 
 125 See Wilson, supra note 108. 
 126 The idea here is that a state offering neither same-sex marriage nor domestic 
partnerships has no compelling policy reason to enforce Marvin agreements, insofar as 
those agreements endorse unmarried relationships. 
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partners face severability issues, while Proposition 8 and 
California’s domestic partner statutes show that California’s 
public policy strongly favors formally-recognized relationships 
regardless of sex.127  Thus, a proposed statute must accomplish 
two primary things if it is to afford same-sex couples a consistent, 
uniform method of enforcing Marvin agreements.  First, it must 
specifically enumerate under what circumstances a same-sex 
couple may contract for property and services, and particularly 
when sexual services become severable.128  Second, it must ratify 
the same-sex cohabiting relationship in a way that neither 
infringes upon the state’s public policy favoring marriage, nor 
seeks to resurrect common-law marriage.129 
In the end, whether it favors or disfavors same-sex 
cohabitation agreements, the California Legislature must clarify 
the rights of same-sex cohabiting couples because the case law is 
sparse and inconsistent130 and Proposition 8 has ushered in a 
public policy unfavorable to same-sex couples.131  Just as 
Proposition 8 defines the rights of same-sex couples wishing to 
marry, a same-sex cohabitation statute should define the rights 
of same-sex couples who do not wish to marry, or its 
equivalent.132  In an effort to urge the Legislature to decide the 
issue, this article thus proposes two statutes, one favoring same-
sex cohabitation agreements and one disfavoring such 
agreements.  A statute designed to enforce same-sex Marvin 
agreements on a purely contractual basis has already been 
proposed, but came at a time when California’s public policy 
landscape was vastly different.133  Therefore, each proposed 
 
 127 Both traditionally solemnized marriage and domestic partnerships have been 
sanctioned by the Legislature, and hence qualify as “formally recognized.” 
 128 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 129 See Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 146 (Cal. 1898) (“Prior to 1895, section 75 [of 
the California Civil Code] provided for marriages by declaration, without the 
solemnization required by section 70; however, the act of March 26, 1895, swept away 
that easy process of marriage.”). 
 130 “Sparse and inconsistent” refers to the relative dearth of Marvin decisions, and 
the clashing Jones and Whorton decisions in particular. 
 131 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 132 “Marriage equivalent” refers to domestic partnerships as a marriage-like option 
for same-sex couples. 
 133 See generally Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. Marvin to Same-Sex 
Couples: A Proposal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute, 25 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (1992).  When Bullock published her Comment, the prevailing sign of 
California’s public policy was section 308.5 of the California Family Code which restricted 
California’s recognition of marriage to those between a man and a woman and was 
enacted following the passage of Proposition 22.  Since Bullock’s article in 1992, 
Proposition 8 and the domestic partnership statutes have changed California’s views on 
same-sex relationships considerably. 
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statute will reflect the public policy aspect implicit in California’s 
same-sex relationships, which the earlier statute did not.134 
V.  TWO PROPOSED CALIFORNIA COHABITATION STATUTES 
REFLECTIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
A. Proposed California Family Code Sections 297.6 and 297.7:  
Rights of Same-Sex Couples to Make Enforceable Cohabitation 
Agreements135 
The following are two proposed statutes for the California 
legislature to consider in order to clarify the uncertainty 
surrounding Proposition 8.  One statute allows California’s same-
sex cohabiting couples to make enforceable property and support 
agreements, while respecting the state’s public policy favoring 
marriage as expressed in Proposition 8.  The other statute 
disallows same-sex couples that are not registered as domestic 
partners from making cohabitation agreements, with the 
domestic-partner restriction likewise reflective of California’s 
public policy. 
§ 297.6: Unmarried couples, regardless of sex, shall have 
the full and exclusive right to make enforceable 
agreements for support and division of property, their 
marital status notwithstanding, as part of any committed 
relationship, whether including sexual relations or not, 
where the agreement expressly or impliedly lists any 
reasonable consideration for the services rendered other 
than the mere instance of sexual relations. 
This section recognizes that such agreements arise from 
relationships that in no way resemble traditional 
marriage between a man and a woman, and in enforcing 
this section and respecting the current public policy of 
this state, the Legislature in no way approves of or 
endorses such relationships for their moral character, or 
for any other reason.  Furthermore, this section in no 
way grants unmarried same-sex couples any of the rights 
 
 134 While Bullock’s statute is intelligently fashioned, it treats same-sex cohabitation 
contracts as solely a contract issue, while Proposition 8 and other California legislation 
clearly indicates the state has a strong public policy favoring traditional marriage.  
Furthermore, Bullock supports her contention that California is increasingly amendable 
to same-sex Marvin agreements by citing only Whorton and one Texas case, which does 
not represent a resounding mandate.  Simply put, no one knows whether California courts 
will continue to enforce same-sex Marvin agreements at all, particularly in light of 
Proposition 8’s seismic shift of the public-policy landscape.  California courts may 
continue to treat Marvin agreements as purely contractual issues divorced from public 
policy, but this Comment argues that it is shortsighted to assume that what were once 
purely contractual considerations will always remain so. 
 135 These section numbers were chosen so the proposed statutes would immediately 
follow the first domestic partnership statute in the California Family Code. 
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enjoyed by married persons or domestic partners, nor 
should any provision of this section impair or otherwise 
affect the rights of traditional married couples to enjoy 
any of the rights afforded them under California law. 
 (a) For the purposes of this section, the following 
definitions shall apply: 
  (1) “Unmarried couple” shall refer to the committed 
relationship of two persons, regardless of sexual 
orientation, who live full-time with one another in the 
same residence but have not solemnized their union with 
formal state recognition, either traditional marriage or a 
domestic partnership. 
  (2) “Sex” shall refer to the biological orientation of 
each partner, with transgendered individuals to be 
classified according to their biological sex at the time 
when the agreement was made. 
  (3) “Agreement” shall refer to an enforceable contract 
with ample consideration, according to generally accepted 
principles of California contract law. 
  (4) “Marital status” shall refer to a traditional 
marriage as defined in the California Constitution and 
section 300 of the California Family Code ,136 or a 
domestic partnership as set forth in section 297 of the 
California Family Code, or the absence of either relation 
thereof. 
  (5) “Committed relationship” shall refer to relation-
ships where both partners have been exclusively 
domiciled with one another in a common residence, and 
where the partners have engaged in sexual relations and 
other indicia of an exclusive, intimate relationship, for a 
period of no less than ten (10) years.137  Partners whose 
relationships do not meet the ten year standard, yet who 
seek to enforce such property or support agreements, will 
have their recovery, if any, prorated according to a 
percentage commensurate with the length of their 
relationship under this section.138 
 
 136 “Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and 
a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making the contract is necessary.” 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2010). 
 137 This provision is intended to reflect section 4336 of the California Family Code 
regarding spousal support, where the legislature defines a “long marriage” as one of ten 
year duration or more. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4336 (Deering 2010).  Just as a long marriage 
has different spousal support requirements than a short one, so too should cohabiting 
partners have different obligations to one another depending on the length of their 
cohabitation. 
 138 Likewise, this proposed term is based upon the California Family Code’s spousal 
support provisions.  Among the factors governing spousal support is the expectation that 
a party seeking support will be self-supporting within a time equivalent to one-half of the 
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  (6) “Sexual relations” shall refer to the physical act 
and shall be construed as one part of, but not an essential 
or irreducible aspect of, a committed intimate 
relationship. 
 (b) For the purposes of this section, home-based 
activities, including but not limited to cooking, cleaning, 
and housework in general, and activities typical of a 
committed partner, including but not limited to moral 
and emotional support, are not to be considered related in 
any way to the couple’s sexual relationship, and may 
constitute adequate, independent consideration for any 
agreement. 
§ 297.7: Unmarried couples, regardless of sex, who share 
a common residence shall be prohibited from making 
enforceable agreements for support and division of 
property, regardless of the length of their relationship, 
where such couples share a committed relationship 
marked by sexual relations and/or other indicia of an 
exclusive intimate relationship, and the partners are 
neither legally married to one another under section 300 
of the California Family Code nor registered together as 
domestic partners under section 297 of the California 
Family Code. 
 (a) For the purposes of this section, the following 
definitions shall apply: 
  (1) “Unmarried couple” shall refer to the committed 
relationship of two persons, regardless of sexual 
orientation, who live full-time with one another in the 
same residence but have not solemnized their union with 
formal state recognition, either traditional marriage or a 
domestic partnership. 
  (2) “Sex” shall refer to the biological orientation of 
each partner, with transgendered individuals to be 
classified according to their biological sex at the time 
when the agreement was made. 
  (3) “Agreement” shall refer to an enforceable contract 
with ample consideration, according to generally accepted 
principles of California contract law. 
  (4) “Marital status” shall refer to a traditional 
marriage as defined in the California Constitution and 
 
marriage’s duration, up to the ten year limit expressed in section 4336.  The idea is that, 
theoretically, the longer a marriage lasts, the more responsibility one partner has to 
support the other afterward. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (Deering 2010).  The author has 
adapted the provision to fit a cohabitation agreement, whereby the longer the 
cohabitation, and therefore the longer the “marriage-like” relation lasts, the greater the 
expectation that one party must support the other under the agreement. 
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section 300 of the California Family Code139, or a 
domestic partnership as set forth in section 297 of the 
California Family Code, or the absence of either relation 
thereof. 
  (5) “Committed relationship” shall refer to relation-
ships where both partners have been exclusively 
domiciled with one another in a common residence, and 
where the partners have engaged in sexual relations and 
other indicia of an exclusive, intimate relationship, for a 
period of no less than ten (10) years.140 
  (6) “Sexual relations” shall refer to the physical act 
and shall be construed as an irreducible aspect of a 
committed intimate relationship, consistent with the 
interpretation of the California judiciary. 
B. Note on Proposed Cohabitation Statutes 
The point of these proposed statutes is to urge the California 
Legislature to clarify the state of Marvin agreements under the 
new Proposition 8 public policy.141  Section 297.6, which allows 
Marvin agreements, must navigate a public-policy minefield that 
is hostile to same-sex relationships, so it is much longer and 
requires a more careful definition of terms.142  In contrast, section 
297.7, which disallows Marvin agreements regardless of sexual 
orientation, is shorter and less ambiguous, and is supported by a 
public policy subtext disfavoring non-formalized marriage 
relationships.143  While same-sex marriage statutes are not 
permanent,144 they can at least offer some insight as to what 
rights, if any, same-sex couples have in making and enforcing 
 
 139 See supra note 137. 
 140 See supra note 137. 
 141 To the extent the California Supreme Court insists Proposition 8 merely reserves 
the designation “marriage” for opposite-sex couples and otherwise does not affect couples’ 
constitutional rights to enjoy intimate, committed relationships, the court has already 
spoken regarding same-sex couples’ Marvin rights.  Nothing intrinsic to a same-sex 
relationship qua same-sex relationship should affect its Marvin standing. See supra note 
93.  However, the Strauss decision did not address the practical realities of Marvin 
agreements, and such contractual agreements are not under constitutional purview 
anyway, but are governed instead by civil law—hence the urgency for legislative 
clarification. 
 142 See supra Parts V.A & B.  A particular conundrum is distinguishing cohabitation 
from marriage-like relationships in light of California’s public policy favoring marriage or 
other formalized relationships, e.g., domestic partnerships.  The challenge lies in 
enforcing agreements arising from relationships that are sufficiently intimate and lengthy 
so as to warrant governmental protection and recognition, without treating those 
relationships too much like marriages. 
 143 See supra Part V.B.  This proposed statute did not need to address the severability 
of sexual relations, nor the possibility that a same-sex relationship might presume to be 
“marriage-like” in the sense that the Hewitt court disfavored. See supra note 105. 
 144 See supra note 108. 
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Marvin agreements.  After all, some information, however 
fleeting, is preferable to perpetual uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
With the enduring popularity of cohabitation as a lifestyle 
choice,145 it is noteworthy that California courts have yet to 
clarify cohabitating same-sex partners’ rights regarding 
enforceable property and support agreements.146  Same-sex 
partners particularly deserve clarification because their 
relationships have been circumscribed by legislation ranging 
from Proposition 22 to Proposition 8.147  Highlighting the need for 
clarity on this issue and showing how recent shifts in public 
policy color the enforceability of such agreements, this Comment 
offers two proposed statutes to decide the viability of today’s 
same-sex Marvin agreements.148 Proponents of same-sex 
marriage have talked of mounting a ballot challenge to 
Proposition 8, perhaps as early as 2012, leaving only speculation 
in the meantime as to whether same-sex couples’ rights have 
fundamentally changed since Proposition 8 passed in 2008.149  
California’s same-sex couples will thus continue their uneven 
journey along the “yellow brick road,” but it is unclear whether 
they will ever reach the Emerald City. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The avowed ballot challenge150 to Proposition 8 was mooted 
on August 4, 2010, when District Court Judge Vaughn R. Walker 
ruled in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that Proposition 8 was 
unconstitutional.151 Judge Walker’s decision, which un-
equivocally found that Proposition 8 violated the Equal 
 
 145 See supra discussion Part II.A. 
 146 This statement not only points out the ambiguity inherent in severing sexual 
relations from an agreement for services, but also suggests that California courts will not 
continue to overlook public policy considerations in addressing Marvin agreements, if they 
ever have. 
 147 Domestic partnership legislation, as discussed earlier, has also circumscribed 
same-sex couples’ rights, although it has arguably been a positive influence. 
 148 See supra note 111. 
 149 Attendees at a Chapman University School of Law presentation in November 2009 
indicated an effort to repeal Proposition 8 was forthcoming, if not in 2010, then in 2012.  
They will be greeted by a wearied, but not unsympathetic, electorate: in a November 2009 
poll, Californians indicated they supported marriage rights for same-sex partners by a 
51% to 43% margin.  However, nearly 60% of those polled indicated they did not want to 
vote on the issue in 2010. Cathleen Decker, State’s Voters Support Same-Sex Marriage, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/08/local/ 
me-gay-marriage-poll8 (last visited Dec. 10. 2010). 
 150 See supra note 149. 
 151 Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, California’s Ban on Gay Marriage is Struck 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/ 
05prop.html. 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,152 immediately 
set off jubilation among supporters of same-sex marriage and 
strident rhetoric among those opposed.153  Supporters of the 
legislation immediately filed a motion to stay the decision, which 
Judge Walker promptly denied.154  Predictably, the Perry decision 
sparked a series of appeals, not only to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, but also to Governor Schwarzenegger and Attorney 
General Edmund (Jerry) Brown, pleading with them to defend 
Proposition 8.155  Neither has indicated that he will defend the 
measure, which is slated to go before the Ninth Circuit in 
December.156  Proposition 8 is expected to reach the United 
States Supreme Court no matter what the Ninth Circuit decides, 
with some already speculating which Justice might provide the 
swing vote on the sharply-divided Court.157 
Yet, while the recent hubbub over Proposition 8 makes for 
good newspaper and Internet copy, it leaves unanswered the 
question that inspired this Comment: whether California’s same-
sex couples will enjoy greater freedom to make and enforce 
cohabitation agreements.  Most of the public’s attention has 
focused on the agitation over Proposition 8—as if the Perry 
decision needed any historical boost, it came down on President 
Barack Obama’s forty-ninth birthday—and the controversy has 
drawn legal luminaries such as David Boies and Ted Olson, who 
became household names during the Bush v. Gore controversy.158  
Meanwhile, same-sex couples eschewing domestic partnerships, 
who must resort to Marvin agreements, have remained largely 
anonymous and on the sidelines. 
In that regard, California’s cohabitating same-sex couples 
are to their marriage-seeking counterparts what Deanna Durbin 
is to Judy Garland.  Durbin was one of MGM’s first choices for 
 
 152 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 153 See supra note 151. 
 154 Perry, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39.  Judge Walker found that proponents of 
Proposition 8 met neither of the two most critical requirements for issuing a stay: they 
could not show the likelihood of success on the merits, and they could not show 
irreparable injury were their motion denied. Id. at 1134–38.  Judge Walker also 
questioned whether proponents of the measure had standing to pursue their appeal, but 
found their argument unconvincing regardless. Id. at 1134–36. 
 155 Susan Ferriss, Supporters Pressure Brown, Schwarzenegger to Defend Prop. 8 in 
Court, SACBEE.COM (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2010/09/02/ 
2999833/supporters-pressure-brown-schwarzenegger.html. 
 156 Id.  Judge Walker noted both Brown and Schwarzenegger’s unwillingness to 
defend Proposition 8 in his decision finding the legislation unconstitutional. See supra 
note 151. 
 157 Edward A. Adams, House Supports Marriage Equality Resolution, 96 A.B.A. J. 62, 
62 (2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_backs_marriage_ 
equality_for_gays_and_lesbians. 
 158 See supra note151. 
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the role of Dorothy Gale in The Wizard of Oz, but has faded into 
obscurity as Garland became synonymous with the role and the 
film.159  If history is a guide, Proposition 8 will be associated with 
same-sex marriage in the same way Garland is associated with 
The Wizard of Oz, and same-sex cohabitating couples may fade 
into oblivion the same way Durbin is now best known as the 
answer to a trivia question.  The comparison is apt: Durbin had 
her heyday in the late 1930s but is largely anonymous now,160 
just as same-sex cohabitation had its heyday in the wake of 
Marvin but such couples get scant attention now.  The purpose of 
this Comment is to highlight the lesser-known stakeholders in 
the same-sex rights debate, in the hope that California’s same-
sex couples get better directions from California courts than 
Dorothy got from the Scarecrow. 
 
 159 Durbin, a Canadian-born actress who won a special “Juvenile Oscar” in 1938, had 
a film career spanning the late 1930s and 1940s. Deanna Durbin, INTERNET MOVIE 
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0002052/bio (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).  For 
more on Durbin, see Tim Dirks’ review of The Wizard of Oz on the American Movie 
Classics website, http://www.filmsite.org/wiza.html. 
 160 PAULINE KAEL, 5001 NIGHTS AT THE MOVIES 136 (1991).  As for the relative 
invisibility of same-sex couples after Marvin, it bears noting that the only prominent 
same-sex cohabitation cases, discussed supra, arose in its immediate aftermath.  One 
puzzling issue is what has happened to all the same-sex Marvin agreements since then.  
Same-sex couples might not be making Marvin agreements, or might not be enforcing 
them, or might simply be keeping their agreements out of court.  Which factor 
predominates is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Comment. 
